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     he idea of perfidy arouses strong debate, as exemplified by the arguments 
on the lawfulness of the reported 2008 killing of Hezbollah leader Imad 
Mughniyah in Damascus by a bomb concealed in what appeared to be a ci-
vilian vehicle.1 Other examples include the discussion following the Colom-
bian government’s recovery of FARC-held hostages through use of a “white 
helicopter” and a fictitious cover story indicating the operation was being 
conducted by an international humanitarian non-governmental organiza-
tion,2 and a 2009 Australian Commission of Inquiry report into the loss of 
HMAS Sydney II in 1941.3 The latter devoted some thirty-four pages to dis-
pelling theories about what had caused the warship to bring herself so close 
to the German raider HSK Kormoran that she lost all strategic advantage. 
Since no sensible commander would have done so deliberately, argued these 
theorists, the only possible explanation could have been perfidy on the part 
of Kormoran—whether by flying a Norwegian flag, pretending to surrender, 
feigning an engineering or medical emergency, or using the secret call sign 
of a merchant vessel while disguised, and then opening fire without reveal-
ing her true status. Despite nearly sixty years of fervid speculation, the 
Commission found no evidence to support any of these theories.4  
Why does perfidy provoke such persistent, strident and enduring con-
troversy? The idea of perfidy as deceit and treachery still appeals strongly to 
a sense of honor in warfare, calling the greatest opprobrium on those who 
would breach it. Yet this sense of honor has been overtaken in much of the 
                                                                                                                      
1. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, The CIA Violated the Terrorist Bombing Convention, OPINIO 
JURIS (Jan. 31, 2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/01/31/cia-violates-terrorist-bombing-
convention/; Rogier Bartels, Killing With Military Equipment Disguised as Civilian Objects is 
Perfidy, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 20, 2015), http://justsecurity.org/21285/disguising-military-
weapons-civilian-equipment-perfidy-or-be/; Kevin Jon Heller, No, Disguising Military 
Equipment as Civilian Objects to Help Kill Isn’t Perfidy, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 24, 2015), 
http://justsecurity.org/21391/no-disguising-military-equipment-civilian-objects-kill-
perfidy/; Marty Lederman, Perfidy, Ambush, Snipers, and the COLE Bombing (al Nashiri) Case, 
JUST SECURITY (Mar. 24, 2015), http://justsecurity.org/21398/perfidy-ambush-snipers-
cole-bombing-al-nashiri-case/.  
2. See John C. Dehn, Permissible Perfidy? Analysing the Colombian Hostage Rescue, the Cap-
ture of Rebel Leaders and the World’s Reaction, 6 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE 627 (2008). 
3. HMAS SYDNEY II COMMISSION OF INQUIRY, THE LOSS OF HMAS SYDNEY II 
(2009).  












law of armed conflict by its reduction to rules of considerable specificity 
and unemotional application.5 On closer examination, this is also the case 
with the rule against perfidy, which outlaws treacherous deception, but only 
when it has certain results and involves deliberate action. However, this 
reality continues to be obscured by the emphasis on the umbrella term with 
its traditionally condemnatory connotation. 
This article explores the limits of perfidy as a concept in the law of 
armed conflict in light of emerging technologies. The exercise highlights 
the need to recognize perfidy as a breach of international law with a signifi-
cantly limited application, distinct from the many other potential wrongs 
that may be committed in international and non-international armed con-
flicts. 
 
II. THE PROHIBITION OF PERFIDY IN THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
 
In this Part, we outline the longstanding international prohibition on acts 
of treachery, or as it is more contemporarily termed, perfidy. Article 23(b) 
of the Hague Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land of 1907 (Hague Regulations) prohibits killing or wounding “treacher-
ously.”6 Article 37(1) of Additional Protocol I (API) prohibits killing, injur-
ing, or capturing an adversary by means of perfidy.7 Although the nuances 
in the definitions, and their practical effect, are outside the scope of this 
article, it is important to note that Article 37(1) does not supersede Article 
23(b), but rather the two treaties operate concurrently.8 Views differ on 
whether the terms treachery and perfidy are interchangeable and, if not, 
                                                                                                                      
5. Sean Watts, Law-of-War Perfidy, 219 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 106, 107–8 (2014). 
6. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Con-
vention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2227, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. 
7. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter API]. 
8. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF IN-
TERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 571 (2d ed. 2010). While agreeing that the two treaties 
operate concurrently, Watts argues that there is a strong interpretative case that vis-à-vis 
the perfidy/treachery provisions, the provisions on perfidy in API replace the provisions 
on treachery in the Hague Regulations. Watts, supra note 5, at 151–52. Of course, the 
Hague Regulations remain the operative treaty law for non-State parties to API or in 












which one is more or less inclusive.9 For the purposes of this article and in 
keeping with API, the term perfidy will be used.  
Article 37(1) of API defines perfidy as “[a]cts inviting the confidence of 
an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to 
accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, with intent to betray that confidence.” The International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its Customary International Humanitarian Law 
study (CIL study) suggests that this definition defines the essence of perfi-
dy and treachery in international and non-international armed conflicts, 
although the consequences might vary in terms of international criminal 
responsibility for the wrong.10  
Perfidy may generally be said to consist of three cumulative elements. 
First, there must be an identifiable act. Second, this act must either (a) in-
vite the confidence of the enemy to believe he is protected from attack or 
(b) invite the belief in the enemy that he is obliged to accord protection to 
the attacker. Third, the act which invites the confidence or belief of the 
enemy must do so in a way that enables the attacker to intentionally betray 
that confidence or belief, although whether this is to be determined objec-
tively or subjectively is not made clear.  
We next briefly explain these principles in the context of international 
and non-international armed conflicts. 
 
A. Perfidy in International Armed Conflicts  
 
As previously observed, Articles 37(1) of API and 23(b) of the Hague Reg-
ulations are applied concurrently in international armed conflicts. This is of 
significance as they do not comprehensively prohibit all acts of deceit. Pur-
suant to Article 37(1), an act is not perfidious as a matter of law unless it 
results in the killing, injuring or capture of an adversary. Thus, it does not 
prohibit otherwise perfidious acts which result in the destruction of a mili-
tary objective such as a building or a car.11 Similarly, while Article 23(b) of 
the Hague Regulations prohibits the treacherous killing or wounding of an 
                                                                                                                      
9. See Watts, supra note 5, at 143–44; MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL PARTSCH & WALDE-
MAR SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 204 (1982); 1 CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW r. 65 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-
Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter CIL STUDY]. 
10. CIL STUDY, supra note 9, at 221–22.  












adversary, the capture of adversaries or the destruction of property is not 
precluded, even if achieved by otherwise treacherous means.  
Articles 37(1) of API and 23(b) of the Hague Regulations are distinc-
tive in that they do not prohibit the act of perfidy, but rather the outcome of 
the perfidious act as a method of warfare.12 The way in which these articles 
are drafted is an acknowledgement that while there may be some deception 
in methods of warfare, the killing, injuring and capture in API of an adver-
sary by resort to perfidy betrays the social order of war and will undoubted-
ly lead to decreased respect for the law of armed conflict.13 Similarly, the 
Lieber Code provided in 1863 that  
 
while deception in war is admitted as a just and necessary means of hostil-
ity, and is consistent with honorable warfare, the common law of war al-
lows even capital punishment for clandestine or treacherous attempts to 
injure an enemy, because they are so dangerous, and it is difficult to guard 
against them.14 
 
The object of these articles, in both the Hague Regulations and in API, 
is important to keep in mind, particularly when comparing the prohibition 
of perfidy with legitimate ruses of war under Article 37(2) of API.  
 
B. Perfidy in Non-International Armed Conflicts  
 
The question of whether there is a prohibition on acts of perfidy in non-
international armed conflicts is not entirely settled. The ICRC in its CIL 
study observed that the prohibition of perfidy is a customary norm appli-
cable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.15 The 
study did not, however, observe clear and consistent State practice on the 
application of perfidy in the latter, but instead noted divergence in the 
views of States and in their adoption of varying definitions of perfidy. Cer-
                                                                                                                      
12. Rotem Giladi, Out of Context: “Undercover” Operations and IHL Advocacy in the Occu-
pied Palestinian Territories, 14 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW 393, 412–15 (2010). 
13. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, ¶¶ 1499–1500 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe 
Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987). 
14. U.S. Department of War, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the 
United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100 art. 101, Apr. 24, 1863.  












tainly, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions16 and Additional 
Protocol II (APII) to the Geneva Conventions17 do not prohibit perfidy, 
treachery or any recognizably similar formulation in non-international 
armed conflicts. However, the doubts expressed by some commentators 
about the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s deci-
sion in Prosecutor v. Tadić that the prohibition on perfidious conduct applied 
in non-international armed conflicts18 may have been overtaken by the en-
try into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
That Court’s jurisdiction includes, among other serious breaches of the 
laws and customs of war, offenses of treacherously killing or wounding 
combatant adversaries in both international and non-international armed 
conflicts.19 Perfidious damage to military objects remains outside the scope 
of this definition, and the customary international law status of perfidious 
capture, applying to international armed conflicts through API, is unclear.20 
 
C. Ruses of War and Improper Use of Emblems 
 
What is clear, so far as both international and non-international armed con-
flict is concerned, is that there are deceptive acts which do not meet the 
threshold definition of perfidy and are not otherwise forbidden.21 For ex-
ample, acts which amount to “ruses of war” are specifically “not prohibit-
ed” by Article 37(2) of API, which states: 
 
                                                                                                                      
16. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
the Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Con-
vention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.  
17. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter APII].  
18. Prosecutor v. Tadić; Case No. IT-94-1-l, Decision on Defence Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 125 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 
1995). For a discussion of those doubts, see, e.g., SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF 
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 420 (2012).  
19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 8(2)(b)(xi), 8(2)(e)(ix), July 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
20. See Watts, supra note 5, at 111 n.15, 144. 












Such ruses are acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to in-
duce him to act recklessly but which infringe no rule of international law 
applicable in armed conflict and which are not perfidious because they do 
not invite the confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under 
that law.  
 
Further, both API (Articles 38(1) and 39) and the Hague Regulations 
(Article 23(b)(f)) distinguish between acts of perfidy and the separate 
wrong of the improper use of a distinctive insignia, flag or military emblem. 
By way of background, the Hague Regulations require armed forces, who 
legitimately engage in international armed conflict, to “have a fixed distinc-
tive emblem recognizable at a distance” and to “carry their arms openly.”22 
Traditionally, legal requirements as to uniform and appearance have been 
explained as a means of facilitating the principle of distinction.23 While the 
emblem criterion was not included in the API definition of armed forces 
adopted in 1977, it nonetheless remains a legal requirement as API does 
not replace, but rather complements the Hague Regulations. API’s focus, 
so far as military insignia was concerned, was on entirely prohibiting the 
use of flags, insignia or emblems of any State not party to the conflict, and 
the use of the enemy’s indicia was prohibited “while engaging in attacks or 
in order to shield, favor, protect or impede military operations.”24  
These prohibitions apply even though such misuses do not result in 
death, injury or capture. The rules against improper use of insignia are thus 
broader than the rule against perfidy. The prohibition is only against using 
a false emblem or flag. Significantly, these requirements do not extend to 
the mandatory marking of vehicles or other equipment. Although militaries 
may, for their own reasons, choose to apply distinguishing marks, it is not a 
legal requirement.25 The only legal requirement is that if a military does 
choose to mark land vehicles, it must not misuse the markings of the ene-
my, neutrals or other States not a party to the conflict. 
                                                                                                                      
22. Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 1. 
23. See, e.g., Toni Pfanner, Military Uniforms and the Law of War, 84 INTERNATIONAL 
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 93, 118–21 (2004). 
24. API, supra note 7, art. 39(1)–(2). 
25. See BOTHE, PARTSCH & SOLF, supra note 9, at 214, who when discussing use of 
captured enemy vehicles note that it is prohibited to use “captured vehicles, tanks, self-
propelled artillery and other major weapons, without first removing the enemy national 













But there are exceptions in both directions. For example, customary in-
ternational law at sea has long recognized the right of a warship (but not 
military and auxiliary aircraft) to fly a false flag as a legitimate ruse, provid-
ed it is hauled down and the ship’s own ensign is raised before she opens 
fire.26 In contrast, the launching of an attack while feigning “surrender or 
distress by, e.g., sending a distress signal or by the crew taking to life rafts,” 
thereby inviting belief of an obligation to rescue the shipwrecked, is not a 
ruse, but is perfidious in nature.27 Warships are generally considered only to 
be prohibited from  
 
actively simulating the status of: 
 
(a) hospital ships, small coastal rescue craft or medical transports; 
(b) vessels on humanitarian missions; 
(c) passenger vessels carrying civilian passengers; 
(d) vessels protected by the United Nations flag; 
(e) vessels guaranteed safe conduct by prior agreement between the parties, 
including cartel vessels; 
(f) vessels entitled to be identified by the emblem of the red cross or red cres-
cent; or 
(g) vessels engaged in transporting cultural property under special protec-
tion.28 
 
Conversely, customary international law requires that in order for a mil-
itary aircraft to lawfully exercise belligerent rights in an international armed 
conflict, it must, inter alia, “carry an exterior mark indicating its nationality 
and its military character.”29  
                                                                                                                      
26. See, e.g., SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED 
CONFLICTS AT SEA ¶ 110 (Louise Doswald Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MAN-
UAL]; J. Ashley Roach, The Law of Naval Warfare at the Turn of Two Centuries, 94 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 64, 73 (2000). Paragraphs 113–14 of the San Remo 
Manual indicate that the false flag may include the flag of a party neutral to the conflict, 
provided that the specific limitations in paragraph 110 are not breached. This custom is 
preserved by Article 39(3) of API. 
27. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶ 111. 
28. Id. ¶ 110. 
29. Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air 
Warfare, Part II art. 3, Drafted by a Commission of Jurists at The Hague (Dec. 1922–Feb. 
1923), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1923a.htm [hereinafter Hague 













Both the separate wrong of misuse of emblems and the requirements 
for the marking of different vehicle groups pose challenges for the applica-
tion of the concept of perfidy to emerging technologies. In Part III, we re-
view how the law of perfidy might apply to four types of emerging tech-
nology, namely: unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned maritime vehicles, 
autonomous weapons on land and cyber attacks. 
 
III.  PERFIDY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
 
A. Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles 
 
As indicated above, for a military aircraft to lawfully exercise belligerent 
rights in an international armed conflict, that aircraft must, inter alia, have 
exterior markings of its nationality (and not those of any other State) and 
military character. The authors are of the view that this requirement for 
external marking applies equally to manned and unmanned aircraft. The 
Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War 
and Air Warfare of 1923 state, “[t]he rules of air warfare apply to all air-
craft, whether lighter or heavier than air, without discriminating whether or 
not they are capable of floating on water.”30 While these rules do not di-
rectly refer to unmanned aircraft, Article 1 indicates that the rules are in-
tended to have the widest application. Further, the definition of “military 
aircraft” in the Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile War-
fare covers unmanned aircraft.31 Although the Manual is not law as such, 
like the San Remo Manual it was produced by a prominent group of experts 
after a series of meetings and broad consultation with other experts, practi-
tioners and States in an attempt to reflect the various extant treaties and 
customary international law as it applies specifically to the air environment. 
Prima facie, it would appear that the requirement to carry an external 
mark of national and military character applies regardless of the size of the 
unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV). However, there is a point at 
which markings no longer serve a useful purpose. The U.S. Air Force cur-
rently operates a UAV called Wasp III with a wingspan of only 72.3 centi-
                                                                                                                      
30. Id., art. 1. 
31. PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, MANUAL ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WARFARE r. 1(x) (2009). See also 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW RESEARCH INITIATIVE, HPCR COMMENTARY ON 
THE HPCR MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO AIR AND MISSILE WAR-












meters, a length of 25.4 centimeters and a weight of 453 grams.32 Currently 
under development is an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) called the Delfly 
Micro, which weighs just three grams and is only ten centimeters from 
wing tip to wing tip.33 Any marking on such a UAV even if “as large as 
possible”34 would be practically unobservable in flight. One of the authors 
has argued elsewhere that State practice may be moving towards an evolv-
ing customary international law norm that smaller unarmed UAVs need not 
be marked.35 As all UCAVs are still relatively large and are marked, it is too 
early to tell whether this will also be the case for small UCAVs. 
In addition to the marking of the UCAV, there is the issue of who is 
operating it. If it is a civilian, there can be no question of perfidy as a civil-
ian cannot “feign” civilian status. Of course, the civilian would not enjoy 
the combatant’s privilege in an international armed conflict, but that is a 
separate issue. In an international armed conflict, the question is whether 
the military crew of a UCAV must distinguish themselves from the civilian 
population by, for example, wearing military uniform?36 We believe the an-
swer to be yes. While there is some debate about whether the military crew 
of a manned aircraft needs to wear uniform, the better view is that they do 
not.37 This is because in a properly marked military aircraft, sufficient dis-
tinction from the civilian population is achieved merely by being on board 
the aircraft and there is no positive requirement to wear distinguishing mili-
tary uniforms while on board. Of course, wearing such uniforms is useful 
in case the crew is separated from the aircraft in hostile territory (either by 
forced landing or through bailing out).38 However, the crew of a UCAV is 
inherently “separated from the aircraft” and it is for this reason that they 
                                                                                                                      
32. Wasp III, U.S. AIR FORCE (Nov. 1, 2007), http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Fact 
Sheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104480/wasp-iii.aspx. 
33. Delfly Micro, DELFLY, http://www.delfly.nl/micro.html (last visited May 14, 
2015). While it has been referred to as a remotely piloted aircraft, the goal is fully autono-
mous flight. As such, it will ultimately be a misnomer to call it remotely piloted. 
34. Hague Rules on Air Warfare, supra note 29, art. 7. 
35. Ian Henderson, International Law Concerning the Status and Marking of Remotely Piloted 
Aircraft, 39 DENVER JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 615, 627 (2011). 
36. Technically, the issue is about wearing “a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at 
a distance.” Hague Regulations, supra note 6, art. 1(2). 
37. Ian Henderson & Patrick Keane, Air and Missile Warfare, in THE ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ch. 18 (Rain Liivoja & Tim McCormack 
eds., forthcoming September 2015). 
38. See Hague Rules on Air Warfare, supra note 29, art. 15 (“The crews of military air-
craft shall bear a fixed distinctive emblem of such a nature as to be recognizable at a dis-












should wear a distinguishing uniform. Further, it will not usually be appar-
ent what sort of unmanned aircraft is being operated by a ground crew (i.e., 
military or civilian, military medical aircraft or UCAV). 
The prohibition on perfidy incorporates no definitive requirement of 
proximity in the perfidious act, only that the act results in a prohibited out-
come. Therefore the requirement to wear a uniform applies regardless of 
the ground crew’s distance from the battlefield. The enemy’s ability to at-
tack a UCAV crew is limited by the enemy’s ability to project force, not 
inherently by the location of hostilities. While there is an alternative argu-
ment—that the need for the perfidious act “to invite confidence” in the 
enemy implies an element of proximity or causation between the act and 
the responders, which might limit perfidy to the visible appearance of the 
UCAV no matter who is operating it or what they wear—this is by no 
means clear.  
There are two exceptions to the above. First, as discussed in Part II.A, 
in an international armed conflict to which API applies, in certain circum-
stances a combatant retains the combatant’s privilege and does not commit 
perfidy by omitting to wear a distinctive sign.39 There is no reason in prin-
ciple why this would not apply to a UCAV crew, although we would query 
what would be sufficient for the UCAV crew to meet the criterion of carry-
ing their arms openly. Second, the discussion above as to the requirement 
for a UCAV ground crew to wear uniform applies in an international 
armed conflict. It is far from clear what the equivalent position would be in 
                                                                                                                      
39. API, supra note 7, art. 44(3) (“In order to promote the protection of the civilian 
population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation 
preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts 
where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish 
himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he car-
ries his arms openly:  
(a) during each military engagement, and 
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military 
deployment preceding the launching of an attack in which he is to participate. 
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall not be considered as 
perfidious within the meaning of Article 37, paragraph 1 (c).”). As explained by Ipsen, this 
rule needs to be “read down” as applying only in exceptional circumstances and having 
very limited application to government forces (see Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-
combatants, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 79, 91–93 (Diet-












a non-international armed conflict. This is a hotly debated issue and be-
yond the scope of this article.40 
A third question flows from the distinction between perfidy and ruses 
explained in Part II.C: into which category does camouflaging a UCAV to 
look like a bird or other flying animal fall?41 Militaries have long used ani-
mals to augment their military capability, including horses,42 dogs,43 ele-
phants,44 bears45 and, very relevantly, pigeons.46 While animals would, argu-
ably, have to meet the definition of a military objective under API Article 
52(2) before being attacked, they enjoy no special protection under the law 
of armed conflict. It would seem, therefore, that there is no legal prohibi-
tion on disguising a UCAV to look like a flying animal.  
The trickier question is whether the UCAV would have to bear external 
national and military markings. There is no legal requirement, under treaty 
or customary international law, to “distinguish” military working animals, 
including flying military working animals, from “civilian” animals. The re-
quirement for a UCAV to have visible external markings is a customary 
international law issue, and the rules for small UAVs, including UCAVs, on 
the bearing of external markings are arguably still evolving. Accordingly, at 
this time it is not possible to say with certainty whether or not a UCAV 
camouflaged as a flying animal would be required to bear external mark-
ings. However, it would seem likely that the same rule, whatever that may 




                                                                                                                      
40. See Ian Henderson, Civilian Intelligence Agencies and the Use of Armed Drones, in 13 
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 133 (Michael Schmitt, Louise Ar-
imatsu & Tim McCormack eds., 2010). 
41. Our thanks to Mrs. Nicki Henderson for posing this interesting question. 
42. JOHN M. KISTLER, ANIMALS IN THE MILITARY: FROM HANNIBAL’S ELEPHANTS 
TO THE DOLPHINS OF THE US NAVY 97 (2011). 
43. Including by the Russians in an anti-tank role during WWII. Will Stewart, Revealed: 
Stalin’s Kamikaze Canines Who Were Trained to Blow Themselves Up as Anti-Tank Dogs, DAILY 
MAIL (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2517413/The-kamikaze-
canines-blew-destroy-Nazi-tanks-WWII-photographs-reveal-Stalins-dogs-war-explosives-
strapped-them.html. More generally, see KISTLER, supra note 42, ch. 1. 
44. KISTLER, supra note 42, ch. 2. 
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B. Unmanned Maritime Vehicles 
 
The longer and arguably more detailed development of the law of the sea 
and of naval warfare, combined with the nature of the maritime environ-
ment, treats unmanned maritime vehicles somewhat differently. The first 
problem of nomenclature is that “unmanned maritime vehicles” may mean 
many different things. The category includes unmanned underwater vehi-
cles (UUVs), unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned vehicles 
which, while not aircraft in the sense previously discussed, affect airspace 
from the sea, for example in weapon delivery. All of these vehicle types 
may be launched from the surface, underwater or from the air, and they 
may make way themselves in the water or may be towed or tethered. Some 
may also meet the definition of an unmanned combat underwater vehicle, 
such as the CAPTOR mine. In use since 1979, this mine is emplaced by 
torpedo and is programmed to launch a second torpedo when a hostile 
acoustic signature is identified.47  
More recent technology emphasizes “bio-mimicry,” such as the U.S. 
Navy’s “GhostSwimmer” UUV, which was tested in December 2014. This 
five-foot fish-shaped UUV is designed to “swim” by oscillating its tail and 
is intended to provide a capability for “low visibility intelligence, surveil-
lance and reconnaissance . . . missions and friendly hull inspections.”48 This 
system will complement the use of actual “Marine Mammal Systems” (dol-
phins and sea lions) in mine detection and clearance operations, such as 
occurred with the REMUS vehicles used during the clearance of Um Qasr 
port in Iraq in 2003.49  
A second problem of nomenclature concerns the issue of how to clas-
sify UMVs. Academic consensus seems to be forming, relying on the 
COLREGs (popularly known as the Rules of the Road),50 that a vehicle 
controlled from shore meets the definition of a ship or vessel for the pur-
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poses of the law of the sea, provided it can make way (compared to float-
ing debris, for example).51 While McLaughlin classes a USV/UUV operated 
from shore as “capable of strict characterization as a warship,” he prefers 
to achieve sovereign immune status for them by categorizing them as gov-
ernment ships operated for non-commercial purposes.52 This becomes 
problematic for the prohibition against perfidy if the vehicle is used to 
cause death, destruction or capture in armed conflict. If controlled from a 
ship or aircraft, it will share the legal status of that craft,53 a limit which 
would tend to require that, to avoid committing perfidy, an unmanned 
maritime system would need to be operated from a warship or military air-
craft during armed conflict. If considered to be a separate vessel, then it 
would need to meet marking requirements and, as set out above, if operat-
ed by military personnel those personnel would need to distinguish them-
selves through the wearing of uniforms. 
To these complexities must be added the further refinements that mili-
tary UUVs, like warships as discussed above, are in some circumstances not 
required to be physically marked and when submerged are not in any case 
identifiable by such means. When also operated by civilians, how then does 
such a UUV, used to kill or wound the enemy, not bring itself within the 
purview of the prohibition on perfidy? And yet it is not the case that the 
use of UUVs to kill, wound or (in an international armed conflict and as-
suming it is physically possible) capture the enemy is prohibited as a meth-
od of warfare. Similarly, both the rules governing prohibition on perfidy at 
or from the sea and the traditionally legitimate ruse of flying a false flag 
lack helpfulness in a “highly electronic environment and with over-the-
horizon or beyond-visual-range capabilities.”54  
A more effective solution is to refocus on the actual requirements of 
perfidy. As Melzer emphasizes in his seminal analysis of the law governing 
targeted killing, the essence of perfidy is the “deliberate” creation of good 
faith, through acts inviting the enemy’s confidence as to their legal obliga-
tions.55 This question of deliberateness may be the solution to the challeng-
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es of marking emerging platforms. If the UUV is either actually or in effect 
unmarked so that there is no issue of misuse of emblems, then the better 
question may be whether there has been a deliberate effort to invite confi-
dence as to status vice an attempt merely to take advantage of the enemy’s 
lack of observation. That is, if an unmarked UUV is not purporting to be a 
protected civilian object (if that is possible without misuse of emblems) but 
instead a fish (mimicry) and the enemy assumes that it is untargetable be-
cause it does not seem to them to pose a threat, then the issue is closer to 
that of camouflage as a legitimate ruse, rather than perfidy. In an era where 
UCAVs, UAVs, UUVs, etc. are known to be in use in conflicts that often 
transcend traditional formulations of marking and targeting because they 
do not necessarily proximately involve armed military combatants, there 
may need to be reconsideration of where the risk should lie between adver-
saries, as long as there is no misuse of specially protected emblems and dis-
tinction from the civilian population is not a factor. 
 
C. Autonomous Weapons on Land 
 
As discussed at Parts III.A and III.B, a key distinguishing legal feature be-
tween land vehicles and aerial vehicles—and subject to some limitations, 
maritime vehicles—is that there is no treaty or customary law requiring 
land vehicles to bear distinguishing marks. Military forces are obliged only 
to ensure vehicles do not bear false external marks, whether those are em-
blems of special protection, neutrality or, in more limited circumstances, of 
the enemy. Accordingly, so long as an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) 
does not look like a human, there is no requirement for it to bear distin-
guishing external marks.  
As with camouflaged UCAVs, a UGV camouflaged to look like an an-
imal (for example, a mule) would not be required to bear distinctive exter-
nal marks. However, the authors submit, de lege ferenda, that a UGV that had 
broad human form should bear a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at 
a distance (for example, the uniform of the military forces operating or de-
ploying the UGV) in similar circumstances to combatants. The rationale 
for this position is that the purpose behind the rule requiring combatants 
to distinguish themselves from the civilian population is the protection of 
the civilian population. A UGV with broad human form that did not bear a 
fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance would endanger the ci-












Again, there is the issue of who is operating the UGV. As with UCAVs 
and UUVs operating independently of a ship, if it is a civilian who is oper-
ating the UGV, there can be no question of perfidy as a civilian cannot 
feign civilian status. However, unlike with aircraft, it has never been the law 
that combatants in or on a land vehicle need not wear a uniform. Accord-
ingly, and a fortiori in an international armed conflict, the military crew of a 
UGV must distinguish themselves from the civilian population. Again, the 
requirement to wear a uniform applies regardless of whether the crew is 
proximate to or distant from the battlefield. Finally, the same two excep-
tions discussed for UCAVs (the application of Article 44(3) and the uncer-
tainty of the law applicable in non-international armed conflicts) apply to 
UGVs. 
 
D. Cyber Attacks 
 
As is apparent from the above analysis, the operational environment (land, 
maritime or air) affects the determination of the appropriate rules of the 
law of armed conflict. The authors submit this carries over to cyber in the 
sense that the location of the hardware being used to conduct the cyber 
attack56 is relevant in determining the applicable rules. Unfortunately, what 
can be stated as a simple proposition is not so simple in reality. For exam-
ple, assume a cyber attack is initiated from a warship, but is routed through 
a land-based network. Is it the law of maritime or land warfare that ap-
plies—or both? We will return to that question later; but, in the meantime, 
two general propositions can be set out. 
First, it is prohibited to launch a cyber attack that directly contributes 
to the killing, injuring or, where API applies, capture of an adverse party by 
perfidious means. The Tallinn Manual, comprising a number of rules and 
associated commentary, is currently the most comprehensive work address-
ing the application of the law of armed conflict to cyber operations.  
Uncontroversially, Rule 60 states that the prohibition on perfidy applies 
to cyber operations and Rule 61 states that ruses are permitted in cyber op-
erations. Unfortunately, what amounts to perfidy in cyberspace is much 
less clear. Sending an e-mail falsely claiming to be an invitation to a meet-
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ing with the ICRC or a false surrender, both with a view to ambush, would 
be perfidious.57 Equally, it would be perfidious to falsely mark military 
websites or IP addresses in such a way as to make them appear to be civil-
ian.58 However, it would not be perfidious to either fail to mark military 
networks, sites, etc. as military or to use actual civilian networks to launch 
attacks.59 It would be unlawful to use a network entitled to special protec-
tion, such as a hospital network.60 It would also probably be perfidious for 
the person launching the attack to feign civilian or other protected status.61 
Thus, how the prohibition on perfidy applies to cyber attacks is nuanced. 
Second, the prohibitions on misuse of protective emblems and em-
blems of nationality also apply to cyber operations beyond just cyber at-
tacks resulting in injury, death or capture. Cathcart provides this example: 
“the manipulation of the enemy’s targeting database so that a friendly mili-
tary headquarters appears as a hospital would constitute perfidy.”62 While 
the authors submit it would be perfidy simpliciter only if the headquarters 
was directly involved in planning and executing operations to kill, injure or 
capture the adversary, Cathcart’s point—that there is a general prohibition 
on misusing emblems of protection that has a considerably more expansive 
operation than the results-focused limits of the rule against perfidy—is well 
made.  
Importantly, however, the broader rule does not prohibit all means of 
feigning protected status, but only the misuse of protected emblems, signs 
and signals. So, while it would be unlawful for a soldier to falsely wear an 
ICRC armband to gain access to an enemy’s prisoner of war camp to con-
duct reconnaissance for a future prison break, it would not technically be 
unlawful merely to orally claim to be from the ICRC and request permis-
sion to inspect the camp. Therefore, if the headquarters is not used directly 
to kill, injure or capture the adversary (e.g., it is a logistics facility), it must 
be questioned whether it actually would be unlawful to alter the enemy’s 
targeting database in the way Cathcart describes, unless actual use is made 
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of the protected emblem—as might be the case if the database identified 
medical establishments pictorially.  
Returning to the matter of the origin of a cyber attack, this issue is 
briefly mentioned in the Tallinn Manual in the commentary to Rule 64. In 
short, the experts participating in the development of the Manual could on-
ly agree that “that the law is unsettled as to whether a cyber attack would 
be permitted from a warship displaying enemy or neutral flags.”63 Unfortu-
nately, there is no explanation why a cyber attack that downs an enemy air-
craft should be treated any differently from the launch of an anti-aircraft 
missile. Hopefully this issue might be clarified in future editions of the 
Manual. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
There is significant contemporary debate concerning perfidy and related 
concepts in armed conflict. There is further debate about the application of 
the law of armed conflict to emerging technology. Taken together, much 
more work still needs to be done on analyzing how the law concerning per-
fidy will apply to emerging technologies. The authors hope this article has 
helped contribute to that debate. In addition, we believe the application of 
the law to existing means and methods of warfare can be illuminated by 
considering that law in novel circumstances, thereby leading to a deeper 
understanding of existing principles and rules and their application to cur-
rent means and methods of warfare. 
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